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From Poisonous Weeds to Endangered 
Species: Shenghuo TV, Media Ecology 
and Stability Maintenance
Wanning SUN 
Abstract: The most common framework through which we under-
stand media communication and political/social stability in China is 
that of hegemony and control. This characterization may have served 
us well in documenting how the mandate for stability often results in 
censorship, regulation and restriction, but it has two major faults: 
First, the focus on crackdowns, bans and censorship usually tells us 
something about what the party-state does not like, but does not 
convey much about what it does like. Second, it often obscures the 
routine ways the party-state and the market work together to shore 
up ideological domination and maintain stability. In this analysis of 
the policies, economics and content of a broad range of television 
programmes, I suggest that we look at the media and communication 
as an ideological-ecological system in order to arrive at a more nu-
anced understanding of the relationship between China’s media prac-
tices and its ongoing objectives. 
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Introduction 
The most common framework within which we understand media 
communication and political and social stability in China is that of 
hegemony and control (e.g. Brady 2008; Hassid 2008; Tong 2010). 
This framework tends to take as given not only the desire and inten-
tion of the central propaganda authorities to control, but also the 
need on the part of the grassroots to contest and resist. This frame-
work is often deployed to demonstrate the complex, ambiguous and 
often changing dynamics between the party-state and the market, and 
between the state and society, as well as the impact of such dynamics 
on China’s social and political stability. This analytic matrix may have 
served us well in documenting how the mandate for stability often 
results in censorship, regulation and restriction. However, this frame-
work comes with two problems. First, while a focus on censorship 
examines tensions between the party-state and the market, which 
flare up from time to time and threaten stability, it often obscures the 
everyday ways the two work together to bolster ideological domina-
tion and maintain stability. Second, the focus on crackdowns, bans 
and censorship usually informs us about certain things the party-state 
does not like, but it rarely reveals what it does like. Consequently, we 
are still somewhat unclear as to what constitutes the central propa-
ganda authorities’ normative expectations for the media. In other 
words, the question remains as to what the ideal “state of being” is 
that the party-state hopes to achieve through control. 
But knowing the answer to this question is crucial to our under-
standing of how media contributes to stability maintenance. And 
since the government sees stability maintenance as pivotal to the 
realization of President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”, understanding 
the party’s expectations provides key clues to how China’s media and 
communication system contributes to the rhetoric and vision of the 
China Dream at both the collective and individual levels. Intending 
this as a thought piece that aims to provoke further conversations 
rather than as an empirically based research paper, I evoke the meta-
phor of ecosystem in order to shed light on a few blind spots in the 
study of Chinese party-state’s censorship practices. My main point is 
that by looking at China’s media and communication as an ideologi-
cal-ecological system, we can begin to explore the complex relation-
ship and interaction between various media forms, genres and prac-
tices in the Chinese media and communication sector.  
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My use of the term “ecology” is deliberately undisciplined, aim-
ing more to exploit the metaphoric value of the term than to profess 
a serious intention to join an established body of work on “media 
ecologies” (Clark 2009; Lum 2006; Strate 2006). Nevertheless, two 
insights from this “media ecology” approach are relevant here; the 
first is that media portrayals help sustain a relatively stable notion of 
human culture. This stability suggests the media works towards main-
taining a state of equilibrium, keeping balance through a beneficent 
mix of media forms and practices. The second perspective is that 
media consists of a dynamic system in which any part is a variable, 
multiply connected, and therefore any media form or practice de-
serves to be viewed as part of a pattern rather than as a single, dis-
crete object (Fuller 2007: 4). While taking these insights into consid-
eration, my engagement of the metaphor also unfolds at a more spe-
cific level. To me, media genres and media formats are analogous to 
flora and fauna species, whose controlled diversity and complemen-
tarity need to be ensured in order that balance and equilibrium are 
maintained. My central argument is that in understanding the rela-
tionship between media practices and political stability, asking why 
some media genres and practices are allowed to thrive is as important 
as asking why others are culled or allowed to go “extinct”.  
Focusing on the Chinese television sector, I pursue this argu-
ment in two parts. In the first part, I analyse the nature of the gov-
ernment’s anxiety regarding news and entertainment – the two “prob-
lematic” media genres that have lately come under tighter scrutiny. 
This is followed by a discussion of some “unproblematic” media 
forms. These programmes, including everyday advice and consumer 
information on a wide range of “life matters”, contribute significantly 
to the balance of ideological ecology, and it may even be possible that 
they have done more for stability maintenance and the party-state’s 
political legitimacy than have news and entertainment. Throughout 
the paper, I suggest that we should not only consider how control 
and censorship is exercised for the sake of achieving and maintaining 
stability but also look beyond news and entertainment for clues to 
how stability is achieved and maintained.  
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Entertainment a Win-Win Solution? 
The political mantra of the reform period has been stability and unity, 
famously encapsulated in Deng Xiaoping’s motto: “Stability trumps 
all” (??????, wending yadao yiqe). The connection between social 
and political stability and the regulation of media content is most 
obvious in numerous speeches made by the top leadership of the 
Central Propaganda Department (CPD). In a meeting organized by 
the CPD in January 2009, Li Changchun, a senior member of the 
Politburo, made it clear that  
those in the cultural sector of propaganda and thought work must 
try hard to improve media’s capacity to lead and guide public 
opinion, to strengthen and reinforce “main melodies” (???, zhu 
xuanlü) – that is, healthy and uplifting mainstream patterns of 
thought – and to work continuously in maintaining unity, stability 
and harmony (China News 2009). 
Echoing this mandate, propaganda chief Liu Yunshan was more spe-
cific about propaganda strategies:  
We must simultaneously watch out for potential risks and adversi-
ties [and] demonstrate confidence and determination. And we 
must keep a delicate balance between promoting positive messa-
ges, on the one hand, and neutralizing negative public morale [?
????? , shudao gongzhong qingxu], on the other (China News 
2009).  
At the same time, the government is also acutely aware that this “deli-
cate balance” can only be achieved through controlled diversity. This 
commitment to diversity is evidenced in the report delivered by Hu 
Jintao to the 18th Party Congress, when he said, “We must ensure 
that that our social and cultural life is ‘diverse and plentiful’ (???
?, fengfu duocai), and that our cultural products become more abun-
dant and diverse” (Hu 2012). In other words, the function of the 
media can no longer be to singularly serve the party; instead, media 
must be multifunctional and aim to  
 communicate news and current affairs,  
 uphold moral guidance,  
 engage in scientific education,  
 provide suitable recreation, and  
 offer information and services useful in viewers’ everyday lives.  
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Diversity is also logical given that the identity of the television viewer 
has multiplied. Whereas in the Maoist era, the viewer was little more 
than a member of the “masses” (??, qunzhong), the viewer nowa-
days is simultaneously a sovereign subject of the Chinese nation, a 
consumer, a citizen and a member of the public. Similarly, to fulfil 
these multiple roles of the media and ensure that there is something 
for everyone, television genres also need to be diverse, including 
news and current affairs, entertainment, consumer information and 
advice, public service and community notices, as well as advertising, 
and so on.  
As is the case elsewhere, news is considered by the government 
to be the most important media genre. But news, especially news in 
the government-run media, has a very serious credibility problem 
(Shirk 2011). Furthermore, more than other media genres, news 
shoulders the greater share of responsibility of producing and main-
taining the “main melody” – the dominant ideological and political 
values of the regime. From the point of view of the government, 
news, if managed “properly”, functions to maintain stability and 
shore up political legitimacy. However, if handled inappropriately, it 
runs the risk of causing or triggering widespread panic, chaos and 
social unrest. For fear of causing social instability, or in the name of 
maintaining stability, Chinese state media tends to deny or suppress 
sensitive information on a wide range of issues, including epidemic 
diseases, scandals involving food poisoning and accidents involving 
high numbers of causalities. The media’s initial cover-up of the 2003 
SARS epidemic for fear of causing widespread confusion and panic 
among the people was a most telling example of the party-state’s 
instinctive desire to avoid chaos (Yu 2007, 2009; Shirk 2011). But it 
soon became apparent that such a tactic of risk management could 
only backfire, and would serve only to highlight the state’s inaction as 
well as the disastrous consequences of its inaction on the Chinese 
people’s sense of safety. In 2008, Chinese media’s initial cover-up of 
the Sanlu milk formula poisoning scandal, one of many incidents of 
this nature, resulted in the illness of thousands of infants, causing 
outrage from major international media outlets including the New 
York Times and the Wall Street Journal, who published intensive cover-
age on the incident featuring headlines such as “Censorship Isn’t 
Good for China’s Health” (Kine 2008). More than any other media 
genre, news has to walk a tightrope between control and transparency. 
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Besides the politically sensitive nature of news, news is also 
much more expensive than other types of programming to produce, 
and generally does not attract high ratings. Given the decentralization 
of provincial and local television industries in fiscal and administra-
tive terms, it is understandable that local and provincial television 
does not want to make news production a core business, especially 
since other mediums such as the Internet and social media outlets are 
bringing about diverse sources of information, which makes produc-
tion of television news an onerous task. Due to these factors, most 
provincial stations have reduced the production of local and provin-
cial news. They generally relay only the half-hour compulsory news 
bulletin from CCTV each day on at least one of each province’s sta-
tions. These changes have resulted in a gradual shift in the scale, 
amount and format of news in the Chinese media. At local and pro-
vincial levels, the percentage of news and current affairs in the total 
quantity of media content is much smaller. In contrast, entertainment, 
which is pivotal to the economic survival of media enterprises and 
attracts much higher ratings than news, is instead becoming more and 
more popular.  
The Political Risk of Entertainment 
However, while this strategy had reaped enormous economic benefits 
for the media industry, at the same time it had clearly tipped the bal-
ance desired by the central government. In October 2011, the State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) – since 2013 
the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Tele-
vision (SPPRFT) – issued a set of directives that set out to “clean up 
the screen” and shake up Chinese television in a number of profound 
ways (Bai 2015: 69). Among the changes stipulated in SARFT’s “Fur-
ther Recommendations on the Regulation of Provincial Satellite Tele-
vision Programmes” are an increase of the quantity of news, a reduc-
tion of the quantity of entertainment and an improvement of the 
quality of the remaining entertainment programmes. According to the 
recommendations, as of 1 January 2012, all provincial satellite stations 
must show at least two hours of locally produced news from 6 a.m. to 
midnight each day; there must be at least two news programmes from 
6 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. each day, and each of these two news pro-
grammes must not be shorter than half an hour in duration. The 
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recommendations call for an increase in the percentage of content in 
the areas of economics, culture, science and education, and in chil-
dren’s programming and documentaries, in addition to news. It also 
orders the reduction, even culling, of seven types of entertainment 
programmes, including the genres of dating, talent shows, quiz 
shows, talk shows and reality TV. It also stipulates that provincial 
satellite TV broadcast no more than two shows each day, limited to a 
total of 90 minutes (Renmin Ribao 2011). 
According to SARFT’s official spokesperson, these recommen-
dations are intended to address a worrisome tendency towards “ex-
cessive entertainization” (?????, yule guodu hua). It is clear that 
“excessiveness” refers to both the quantity and quality of entertain-
ment programmes – there is too much entertainment, and these en-
tertainment programmes are too vulgar. A recent survey commis-
sioned by SARFT of entertainment programmes on provincial satel-
lite television finds that there are currently 126 entertainment pro-
grammes on 34 provincial satellite television stations, featuring mainly 
themes of dating and friendship, talent contests, melodramas, games 
and quizzes, variety shows and talk shows featuring celebrity hosts. In 
addition, the “vulgar taste” of entertainment programmes and “wide-
spread uniformity of entertainment formats” on Chinese television 
also leads to a waste of resources and a stifling of content innovation 
(Renmin Ribao 2011).  
In addition, according to a new ruling by SARFT, the television 
sector is now banned from engaging in three kinds of practices: pub-
lishing a ranking of television programme ratings, eliminating pro-
grammes purely on the basis of poor ratings and judging the quality 
of a programme based on its ratings (Renmin Ribao 2011). This deci-
sion has incurred the ire of media industries. Some complain that if 
SARFT wants to dictate how provincial television stations should 
conduct their business – meaning, expecting them to operate like a 
public service institution – SARFT should be prepared to foot the bill 
(Bandurski 2011). The industry’s annoyance seems justifiable. After 
all, it was the party-state which decided to withdraw most of its fund-
ing and told media to embrace commercialization and competition 
and to seek alternative sources of income through market measures. 
Furthermore, media industries were repeatedly told that as long as 
they toe the party line in producing politically sensitive news, they 
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would be left alone to do whatever they wanted with other genres 
such as entertainment. 
We can view SARFT’s reactions to entertainment programmes 
on Chinese television as a form of moral panic, whereby the party-
state steps in to assume the role of arbitrating and defining vulgarity, 
bad taste and unacceptable moral values. But the source of this panic 
is, however, not so much an innate, aggrieved moral sensibility; rather 
it is a new realization that instead of an ideologically safer zone that 
evades or camouflages social conflicts, entertainment programmes 
can potentially highlight and amplify them. And accentuation of so-
cial conflicts is bad for stability maintenance and must be avoided at 
all costs. It is precisely because of the fear of giving visibility to social 
conflicts that dating shows such as Only If You Are the One on provin-
cial television are judged to be “vulgar” and “trashy”. As the highest-
rated show on Jiangsu Satellite Television, the show captured the 
imagination of the national audience with the myriad blunt and often 
cruel remarks made by its contestants. Ma Nuo, now dubbed the 
“BMW girl”, became a household name in China for her declaration 
on television: “I’d rather sit in a rich man’s BMW crying than sit on 
the back of someone’s bike smiling”. Zhu Zhengfang, dubbed the 
“big house girl”, famously said in one of the episodes: “Only my 
boyfriend can touch my hand; anyone else who wants to touch it has 
to pay 200,000 yuan” (Chen 2011: 57). The popularity of the show 
both alarmed and enraged the Chinese authorities. Initially criticizing 
it for blatantly promoting materialistic and individualistic values, and 
aggravating the tension between the rich and the poor, SARFT re-
quested that the show either lift its moral standard or risk suspension. 
Succumbing to pressure, the show went through a few cosmetic 
changes, adding rural migrant workers, communist party-school aca-
demics and economically and socially marginalized identities to the 
lists of participants. 
Nevertheless, despite these interventions, SARFT’s recommen-
dations iterate its commitment to maintaining diversity.  
We are not objecting to the plentiful and stratified entertainment 
programmes which have mushroomed to cater to the diverse 
tastes and demands of audiences. We expect this to happen in a 
fast-changing society which is experiencing economic transition. 
But we do object to the tendency of some entertainment pro-
grammes to go down the slippery slope of vulgarity and trashiness 
(Renmin Ribao 2011).  
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In other words, diversity is desirable, and balance between serious 
news and entertainment needs to be maintained, but the government 
must dictate the terms and conditions by which such diversity and 
balance is maintained. These terms and conditions dictate that, first, 
the supremacy of “main melodies” must be upheld and, second, there 
must be a hierarchical ordering of television genres and formats as 
seen fit by the government and its delegated authorities. 
What SARFT’s recommendations do not make clear – but which 
one can directly deduce from them – is that the government wants to 
reclaim the ideological battlefield of news. Reclaiming this space is 
deemed important for two reasons: First, the increasingly widespread 
use of the Internet and the proliferation of social media platforms 
means that urban residents, especially educated ones, are getting their 
news online, and often from alternative sources. At the same time, 
the majority of the Chinese population – the rural, the elderly and 
women from socio-economically disadvantaged groups – still see 
television as the main source of information and recreation, yet this 
audience has only minimum access to news of any kind due to the 
reduction of news on television. Given this, it would seem that the 
government has good reason to fear that news with ideologically 
sound messages may become a threatened or even an endangered 
species warranting extra protective and restorative measures.  
In other words, the mandate to bring back more news may well 
be driven by a desire to recover a lost ideological battleground. While 
this impulse is understandable, there does not seem to be any evi-
dence to suggest that the news as envisaged by the central authority 
will be allowed to be any different from the past. There is no talk of 
reforming formulaic news formats, the non-controversial didactic 
style of reporting, the preference for positive stories, or the reliance 
on government officials as news sources. There is no intention to 
change core standards of news worthiness, which currently focus on 
achieving harmony, preserving stability, stimulating the economy and 
promoting patriotism and nationalism. In fact, we can say with near 
certainty that at least in the near future only news which promotes 
harmony (rather than focusing on conflicts) will be allowed to air.  
Two motivations are plausible as the reasons behind SARFT’s 
recommendations: First, by adding more unattractive news the party-
state is simply trading the loss of audience appeal for an increased 
degree of balance and diversity. Second, entertainment programming 
  26 Wanning Sun 

needs serious culling not simply because it is proliferating excessively. 
It is also because those entertainment programmes which highlight 
social conflicts and class tensions instead of promoting social harmony 
and stability are analogous to “poisonous weeds” – a metaphor which 
was in fact often used in socialist decades to describe “unhealthy”, 
“bourgeois” cultural texts that must be eradicated. In other words, 
control of both quantity and quality is seen as necessary to keep en-
tertainment from growing wildly, like weeds, spreading unchecked 
and tipping the ideological-ecological balance. 
Ideologically Sound Programmes
The vibrant growth of entertainment programmes such as Only If You 
Are the One is a direct consequence of cutthroat competition in the 
television market. This competition is largely due to the fact that 
since 1998, at least one channel from each provincial television sta-
tion has gone national via satellite transmission. Whereas before then 
only CCTV could reach a national audience, now the average Chinese 
household receives up to 30 provincial satellite channels and a range 
of local channels in addition to the national programmes, taking the 
competition between central and provincial television and among 
various provincial television stations to an unprecedented level (Zhao 
2008).  
Throughout the past two decades, two television genres have 
been the mainstay of Chinese television. One is drama serials, which 
comprise about 30 per cent of the total television content (Zhu, 
Keane, and Bai 2008: 1). Also, next to news and current affairs, it is 
also the most rigorously scrutinized and regulated form of program-
ming (Zhao 2008). For this reason, the political economy and cultural 
politics of television drama as a genre and format has been systemati-
cally explored (Rofel 1994; Zhu, Keane, and Bai 2008). In contrast, 
another staple genre, shenghuo (??, “everyday life”) television, has so 
far largely eluded critical analysis.  
The increasing popularity of shenghuo television can be explained 
in terms of privatization in the reform era. Privatization here does not 
simply refer to the rise of ownership of private property and the 
state’s retreat from a wide range of social services, including housing, 
education and health care. Equally important, it also refers to the 
subsequent process of “self-fashioning” (Ong 2008) and “self-train-
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ing” in the realm of personal ethics, morality and emotion. Having 
transformed themselves from a “work-unit person” to a “social per-
son” (Farquhar and Zhang 2012), individuals in China, more than 
ever before, are searching on their own for answers and solutions to a 
wide range of ethical, moral and practical questions. For the first 
time, many people realize that they are having to make decisions and 
choices on their own. This has given rise to anxiety, disorientation 
and insecurity in both material and psychological terms (Zhang and 
Ong 2008). In response to this, a wide range of media genres and 
formats have emerged to meet a number of political needs: to defuse 
discontent or even anger stemming from various types of social con-
flict, be it along the lines of gender, class or place; to provide people 
with practical information and advice for their everyday lives; and to 
give moral and ethical guidance to individuals caught in myriad di-
lemmas regarding how to conduct oneself in the world, and in rela-
tion to others. 
Shenghuo television does precisely these things. Nowadays, most 
local, provincial and national stations have a number of designated 
channels and programmes designated for shenghuo TV. On any given 
day, Chinese television is filled with a perplexing array of shenghuo-
themed shows, encompassing topics such as cooking, renovation, 
travelling, shopping, fashion, health and well-being, personal finan-
ces, legal advice, psychological and emotional therapy, relationship 
counselling, marriage advice and family dispute mediation. Ranging 
from CCTV 2’s renovation show Changing Spaces to Shanghai Televi-
sion Channel Young’s Fashion Guide, from local Bengbu Television’s 
Zero Distance to Health to Zhejiang TV’s Woman Who Likes to Help, a 
plethora of lifestyle programmes that combine information with en-
tertainment and employ a diversity of formats such as talk shows, 
reality TV and quizzes and games deliver on a regular basis much-
needed knowledge about how to survive the economic and social 
challenges posed by economic reforms. The latest theme in the 
shenghuo programmes is job-hunting, with half a dozen shows on pro-
vincial television such as Tianjing Satellite TV’s You Are Hired vying 
for a national audience. In these shows, contestants subject them-
selves to the interrogation of prospective employers, and end up 
being accepted or rejected.  
Shenghuo programmes combine practical knowledge and infor-
mation with entertainment and are hugely popular (Xu 2007, 2009). 
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While they appear to be non-political on the surface, they are never-
theless more effective in teaching people a wide range of skills which 
are necessary to survive the turbulence caused by the transition from 
socialism to a neoliberal market economy. And in doing so, these 
shows perform a profoundly ideological role on behalf of both the 
party-state and capital (Lewis, Martin, and Sun 2012). In contrast to 
entertainment-oriented shows such as dating shows, which have of-
fended central authorities for their provocative comments, the great 
majority of shenghuo programmes have served the twin masters of the 
party-state and the market most effectively by trumpeting the neolib-
eral messages, busily turning social issues such as poverty, poor health 
and lack of opportunities for individuals from disenfranchised groups 
into positive stories of diligent individuals achieving personal growth 
and self-cultivation, be it in the domain of health or mental and psy-
chological well-being. These programmes give viewers the illusion – 
camouflaged as hope – that as long as one tries hard enough, these 
problems can be overcome. This is most clearly evidenced in the 
more than 1,300 lifestyle programmes on Chinese television which 
are devoted to teaching the nation how to engage in health improve-
ment and take part in the “art of nourishing life” (??, yangsheng) 
(Zhou 2011). In other words, a nation of individuals who are exces-
sively preoccupied with and actively involved in maintaining and 
improving their own health is deemed patently more conducive to 
stability than a population that is politically subversive and socially 
discontented. While the didactic instructions from party leaders and 
government officials are often viewed with scepticism, the advice on 
a range of “life matters” comes from doctors, psychologists, scientists 
and experts, and the public often sees no reason to suspect that these 
shows have any hidden agenda other than transmitting scientific, 
objective and practical knowledge. It is precisely for this reason that 
some suggest that commercial media in China in fact can do more 
effective “thought work”, since readers, while they can be sceptical of 
the state media, nevertheless have an implicit trust in the commercial 
media outlets (Stockmann and Gallagher 2011; Stockmann 2013).  
Moreover, these programmes present themselves in such a way 
to have viewers believe that social issues such as poverty, unemploy-
ment, poor health, and so on, can in fact be solved if the individual 
seeks to improve her- or himself through learning and self-develop-
ment – whether it is through improving one’s appearance, attitude or 
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social and cultural capital. Instead of advocating social change, which 
might have political and ideological causes and consequences, these 
programmes present solutions which seem technical and scientific 
(Sun and Zhao 2009). The ideological desirability and political viabil-
ity of these media products that advocate self-responsibility becomes 
clear when judged against the criteria of “good” cultural practice en-
visaged by the outgoing Party Chairman Hu Jintao, who said in his 
report to the 18th Party Congress, “We must guide our people to 
engage in cultural practices in which they can express themselves, 
educate themselves and provide service to themselves” (Hu 2012).  
In other words, SARFT has no problems with entertainment. 
What it does not like is entertainment with no clear – or worse, with a 
questionable – moral orientation. Entertainment that teaches people 
“desirable” values is eminently more preferable. Media practitioners 
are repeatedly reminded of the importance of “education through 
entertainment” (????, yu jiao yu le). Producers of shenghuo pro-
grammes are masterful in acting out this ethos. Featuring the strong 
message of self-improvement and self-responsibility, and armed with 
experts, counsellors and scientists ready to dispense guidance and 
advice, these shows are thriving like “young spring bamboo shoots 
after a rain” (to use another ecological metaphor in Chinese).  
Education through Entertainment 
We now turn to some examples of how “education through enter-
tainment” is accomplished. The first example is from national televi-
sion. Every Sunday evening, the nation is treated to a new episode of 
Under the Auctioneer’s Hammer on CCTV. The programme follows this 
format: The owner of the art object introduces the item, usually an 
antique piece of art, be it a Ming Dynasty vase or a Qing Dynasty urn; 
the owner is then invited to weave in autobiographical information, 
including how the art object came into his or her possession. An 
expert – usually an art historian – is called upon to give historical and 
cultural knowledge about the art object; the owner is invited to name 
a price; a panel of bidders take turns estimating the worth of the ob-
ject in dollars; the owner is offered a chance to provide a rejoinder to 
the evaluations from the panel; the three highest bidders are invited 
to engage in another round of bidding amongst themselves; and, 
finally, either a deal is struck or the object is passed on. The show 
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finishes with a final assessment and evaluation from an art investment 
specialist, who offers his opinion on whether the bidder has paid too 
much or the owner has sold for too little, according to the market 
price. 
There are no right and wrong decisions made on this show – only 
sound and unsound investments, and risk-taking or risk-averse indi-
viduals. By providing a regular dose of knowledge that mixes art, 
history, money and objects for the high-brow viewer who is seeking 
opportunities to maximize his or her financial gains from a wide 
range of middle-class financial activities – be it dabbling in the stock 
market, investing in real estate or purchasing antique furniture or 
expensive art work – the shows encourages the formation of a “pru-
dent subject of risk”, who must be “responsible, knowledgeable and 
rational” (O’Malley 1996: 202). The crucial point of linkage is the 
notion of value, to be explored, understood and assessed according 
to the interweaving logic of the artistic value and market worth. More 
importantly, the show encourages the individual to own up to their 
responsibility for the choices and decisions they make and the risk 
they take. Each participant in the show – the bidders as well as the 
owner of the art object – is there to take a calculated risk. While every- 
one can win, the winner is someone who has taken it upon himself to 
master the knowledge of the most useful market-driven strategies and 
calculative tactics, and who is most capable of translating this 
knowledge into practice. In other words, if you win, you deserve it 
because you have done your homework; if you lose, you deserve it 
equally, because you have not done your homework. Here, the differ-
ence between the rich and poor seems attributable to the difference 
in one’s willingness and capacity to take the initiative, own up to 
one’s responsibilities and acquire the techniques and skills necessary 
to exploit the logic of risk, rather than becoming the victim of it. 
To move from national to local television and get a representa-
tive sample from the latter, let us turn to Bengbu TV. Bengbu is a 
third-tier city in the relatively less developed province of Anhui in 
Eastern China. In comparison with national and metropolitan chan-
nels, shenghuo programmes we see on local terrestrial television such as 
Bengbu TV are made on a shoestring budget and appear decidedly 
basic – some may say crude – in their style, presentation and content. 
Despite this, Zero Distance to Health, a health and well-being pro-
gramme featuring a number of segments, including the “Health Hot-
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line” and “Doctors’ Forum”, runs for half an hour each day, and is 
repeated once the following day. On the episode from 30 May 2011, a 
day I chose randomly for analysis, viewers are told to be aware of ten 
killers in the kitchen, including but not limited to dishwashing rags 
(containing germs), cupboards (harbouring germs), the refrigerator (a 
place for germs to cross-fertilize), detergent (for its chemical ingredi-
ents), food packaging (plastics can cause infertility), plastic wrapping 
(which can cause cancer when heated and consumed) and frying pans 
(which can cause a fire). Again, this information comes from experts, 
whose identity, credentials and sources of information almost always 
remain unknown. The host of the Health Hotline seems to assume it 
is sufficient to tell viewers, often through her own voice-over, that 
this advice comes from “a report written in Europe and the US”, and 
that the suggestions are based on the “latest scientific research”. The 
final segment on the show is about how to correctly choose antibiot-
ics, in view of a widely held assumption that newer and more expen-
sive antibiotics deliver a more effective outcome. The programme 
suggests, quoting doctors, that generic antibiotics, which may not be 
as expensive as new brands, may be even more suitable or effective 
than the brand-name varieties, so patients should learn to discern the 
appropriate antibiotics based on function rather than brand. 
Local television such as Bengbu TV regularly presents a large 
amount of “neutral” information and knowledge – scientific, legal, 
financial and technological – which consumers and citizens must 
acquire in order to manage the risks of everyday life. Although the 
figure of the cultural intermediary – doctors, scientists and counsel-
lors – is crucial, it is down to the individuals to assume the responsi-
bility for managing risk. With the dissolution of work units, and the 
disappearance of its attendant modes of top-down, mass-movement, 
campaign-style propaganda, television in the living room in the re-
form era, turned on and off with the remote control of an entire na-
tion of individual viewers, becomes the means and medium of incul-
cating the new-fangled ethics of self-responsibility.  
Audiences are not only encouraged to be self-responsible, they 
are also told to adjust, correct and improve their behaviour, person-
ality and their ways of thinking and feeling in order to achieve har-
mony and success in life. To promote this idea, emotional, psycho-
logical and relationship counsellors are in high demand. We can see 
how this works from an episode of Speak Loudly, a relationship coun-
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selling show on Chongqing Satellite TV. The episode from 3 June 
2013 features a young, quarrelling couple about to get married. Hav-
ing given the couple the opportunity to justify and account for their 
respective behaviour, the experts step in to diagnose the problem, 
offer advice and, above all, provide moral critique. When the young 
woman complains that her fiancé no longer indulges and spoils her as 
he did in their university years, Tu Lei, a prominent relationship 
counsellor on the panel, has this to say to her: 
Have you thought about why he is no longer happy with you? It’s 
not just because you can’t make beds or you don’t want to wash 
dishes. You have a more serious problem. You haven’t realized 
that that when you were young, put on your feminine charm, and 
demanded to be indulged by your boyfriend, people may think 
you are cute; but now you are an adult and about to start a married 
life, and if you still behave like a child, you will repulse people. 
People change, and their roles change, too. You need to grow up.  
The presence of intermediaries such as emotional and psychological 
counsellors makes these shows more didactic than If You Are the One. 
This difference may partly explain why they do not travel as well as If 
You Are the One, which appeals to international as well as Chinese 
audiences. At the same time, more anchored in Chinese morality and 
cultural values, the aim of these didactic shows is to guide as well as 
to entertain. Their gentle persuasion as well as scathing condemna-
tion (as evidenced in the above comment) constitutes for viewers a 
new form of disciplinary power in post-socialist China. This power 
requires the individual to engage in the “process of problematization” 
by asking which aspects of their behaviour can be changed and im-
proved (Rose 1998: 25). 
Actively promoting the message of self-responsibility and self-
improvement, these programmes are the unsung heroes in the ideo-
logical ecology of the Chinese television, but their role in the process 
of stability maintenance has gone widely unacknowledged. To be 
sure, they are not as spectacularly highly rated as dating shows such as 
Only If You Are the One, and they are not a direct vehicle to communi-
cate the government’s political agenda. They are analogous to those 
flora species which, though they are humble in appearance and grow 
easily in most places, are nevertheless crucial in preventing soil ero-
sion, desertification, droughts and floods. These programmes can 
simultaneously promote socialist values and a neoliberal agenda, and 
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yet the ideologies implicit in them are so deeply embedded that they 
appear to be merely common sense and “natural”. Rather than high-
lighting social tensions, as some dating shows do, these lifestyle pro-
grammes activate the trope of motivation, self-help and personal 
growth, giving people the message that everyone has equal access to 
opportunities and social mobility. For this reason, such shows have a 
profoundly ideological impact of rendering social conflicts invisible, 
yet the party-state, television sector and the market do not care to 
openly admit their ideological and political usefulness.  
Conclusion 
Focusing on controversial media formats and genres tells us what 
happens when political needs and market initiatives clash, posing a 
potential threat to stability. But this is only half of the picture. The 
other half, which runs the risk of being obscured by the focus on 
censorship, is equally, if not more, important: How do the party-state 
authorities and the market work together to ensure that the stability-
maintenance machinery is well-oiled and functioning smoothly?  
There is a widespread assumption informing the regulation pol-
icy: Diversity in media content is necessary not in spite of, but pre-
cisely because of, the mandate to preserve stability. The implicit as-
sumption is that if various parts of the media are implemented and 
interact as they should, the balance and “biodiversity” of the ideologic-
al-ecological system should remain intact, and hence stability can be 
ensured. Similarly to the way that balance and equilibrium are needed 
to ensure ecological soundness in the natural world, policy statements 
and top leaders view the balance and equilibrium of various forces – 
social, cultural, economic and political – as the key to both maintain-
ing stability and realizing the China Dream. Although it is widely 
known that news on state television has to promote “main melodies” 
through hackneyed formats, the propaganda dosage is mostly well-
balanced, counteracted and made bearable by its being sugarcoated 
with a plethora of entertainment programmes so that, ultimately, 
watching television is on the whole an entertaining experience rather 
than a didactic one.  
In light of this, the mission of the party-state is not to control 
media for the sake of control, but to carefully monitor and intervene 
in a timely fashion to stem any tendency which, from the authorities’ 
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point of view, threatens the balance and equilibrium of the ideological 
ecosystem. In the same way that the introduction of a foreign species 
or the sudden death of an existing species may be cause for concern 
regarding the balance of the natural world, the diversity of various 
media genres is a delicate and ongoing balancing act. When the politi-
cal need to maintain diversity dovetails with the market’s drive for 
profit, equilibrium is achieved. This equilibrium may well be what Hu 
Jintao means when he says that the social benefit of cultural produc-
tion must take precedence but that the ultimate goal is to achieve 
“synergy between social benefit and economic benefit” (Hu 2012). 
However, when the market forces get the better of the politics, 
SPPRFT does not hesitate to step in and “play God”. As Brady 
(2008) observes in her study of the control mechanism of propagan-
da, ideological concerns are still more important than economic con-
cerns, as far as the mission of propaganda work is concerned.  
Comparing television genres and formats on state-owned Chi-
nese media outlets to living organisms in the natural environment is 
analytically useful, as long as we are clear about one major premise: 
The diversity of media genres, formats and practices on Chinese tele-
vision is not the same thing as – and in fact, may even work to inhibit – 
political pluralism, tolerance of alternative ideological perspectives 
and an expanded space for public debate or in-depth investigation. In 
deploying the metaphor of biodiversity, it has not been my intention 
to imply that the party-state, through SARFT, has consciously applied 
an ecological approach in its policy deliberations. What I have done is 
to describe and account for the ways in which the Chinese propagan-
da authorities manage the environment of the Chinese media and 
communications sector to achieve and maintain social and political 
stability. This perspective allows us to better delineate the internal 
connections and relationships within the sector. We are therefore able 
to throw into sharp relief a large proportion of media content, such 
as life advice programmes, whose stabilizing role is largely unnoticed, 
let alone understood. An ecological lens enables us to view the vari-
ous parts of the Chinese media landscape as inherently connected and 
mutually impacting. Unlike the control and propaganda perspective, 
which focuses on censorship, an ecological approach allows us to 
illuminate areas that have previously been obscured despite demon-
strating  a profound political impact.  
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